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GOVERNING EXTINCTION IN THE ERA OF
GENE EDITING*
JONAS J. MONAST**
CRISPR-Cas9 genome-editing technology (“CRISPR”) offers a
potential solution for some of the world’s critical conservation
challenges. Scientists are harnessing CRISPR to expand genetic
diversity of endangered species, control invasive species, or
enhance species’ resiliency to a changing climate. Recreating
extinct species is now realistic, as is engineering entirely new
species. CRISPR also creates opportunities to address vectorborne infectious diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and Zika
using gene drive techniques that can spread genetic alterations
through populations.
While CRISPR is a powerful tool to address public health and
conservation goals, it could allow scientists to bypass longstanding value choices underlying national and international
conservation efforts and foster permanent ecosystem impacts
before public policy can react. This Article argues that, while
current conservation laws do not directly address many of the
specific questions that arise with CRISPR, the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”) establishes a framework that can, and
should, guide the use of gene editing. The proposal calls for: (1)
a presumption against the release of genetically modified
organisms that could cause species extinction, (2) exemptions for
specific public health and environmental goals, and (3) updates
to the ESA to clarify oversight of gene editing.
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INTRODUCTION
The world is watching species go extinct in real time. The last
male northern white rhino died in March 2018.1 In September of the
same year, scientists discovered a new threat to the critically
endangered Asiatic lion: canine distemper carried by ticks.2 Killer
whales are at risk of extinction due to chemical pollution in oceans.3
Invasive rodents threaten endangered island-dwelling bird species.4

1. Joshua Berlinger, World’s Last Northern White Rhino Dies, CNN (Mar. 20, 2018,
12:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/20/africa/last-male-white-rhino-dies-intl/index.
html [https://perma.cc/CPX8-9WMN]; Torill Kornfeldt, Bring Back the Northern Rhino?,
SLATE (Nov. 15, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/reorigin-of-speciesexcerpt-cloning-northern-white-rhino-deextinction.html [https://perma.cc/2HVV-UNHP]
(“[N]o more northern white rhinos will be born by natural means.”).
2. Stuart Winter, DEADLY Dog Diseases ‘Wiping OUT’ World’s Rarest Lions - 23
Dead in THREE WEEKS, DAILY EXPRESS (Oct. 3, 2018, 15:00), https://www.express.co.uk/
news/nature/1026298/Lions-dying-deadly-pet-disease [https://perma.cc/D7QC-CHT6].
3. “A Population Marching Toward Extinction”: Missing Orca Feared Dead, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/j50-missing-orca-declareddead-a-population-marching-toward-extinction-2018-09-14/ [https://perma.cc/SA6E-592T].
4. Matt McGrath, ‘Super-Sized’ Mice Threaten Seabird Colonies with Extinction,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-45918770
[https://perma.cc/4THL-7B6F].
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CRISPR-Cas9 genome-editing technology (“CRISPR”) offers a
potential solution for some of these critical conservation challenges.5
Scientists are harnessing CRISPR to expand genetic diversity of
endangered species, control invasive species, and enhance species’
resiliency to a changing climate. Recreating extinct species is now
realistic, as is engineering entirely new species.6 CRISPR also creates
opportunities to address vector-borne infectious diseases such as
malaria, dengue fever, and Zika virus using gene drive techniques
that can spread genetic alterations through populations.
These genetic interventions, however, could foster population
collapse before triggering the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)—the
cornerstone of U.S. legal efforts to prevent extinction.7 The statute
presumes that extinction is gradual, permanent, and an outcome that
humans should generally prevent.8 Advances in biotechnology
challenge each of these conclusions and could circumvent the ESA’s
role in species conservation.9 CRISPR, therefore, could allow
scientists to bypass long-standing value choices underlying national
and international conservation efforts and foster permanent
ecosystem impacts before policymakers can react.
With CRISPR, the critical question is no longer whether humans
can alter genes to eradicate some species and make others resilient to
factors that may cause extinction. Instead, the questions are whether
we should and, if so, under what circumstances. While the potential
benefits are profound, CRISPR could also foment similarly profound,
and potentially irreversible, negative impacts for the target species
5. CRISPR, short for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats,”
utilizes engineered RNA and proteins to edit specific sections of DNA. Questions and
Answers about CRISPR, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/areasfocus/project-spotlight/questions-and-answers-about-crispr [https://perma.cc/Q8XQ-5E9M].
Scientists may use the process to remove targeted DNA or replace the original DNA with
new DNA strands to create new traits. Id. For a more detailed description of CRISPR, see
generally John M. Conley, Introduction: A Lawyer’s Guide to CRISPR, 97 N.C. L. REV.
1040 (2019).
6. Kevin M. Esvelt et al., Emerging Technology: Concerning RNA-Guided Gene
Drives for the Alteration of Wild Populations, 3 ELIFE, no. e03401, July 17, 2014, at 1, 2
(“[S]everal published gene drive architectures could lead to extinction or other hazardous
consequences if applied to sensitive species, demonstrating an urgent need for improved
methods of controlling these elements.”); see also Amy Dockser Marcus, Meet the
Scientists Bringing Extinct Species Back From the Dead, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:27
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-scientists-bringing-extinct-species-back-fromthe-dead-1539093600 [https://perma.cc/B59C-V6AR (dark archive)].
7. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)).
8. See infra Section II.A.
9. See infra Section II.A.
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and the broader ecosystems in which they exist.10 Existing laws are
not designed to grapple with these important value choices.
Gene editing raises many of the hallmark challenges with
emerging technology governance.11 These recent advances in
biotechnology may fall outside the scope of existing regulatory
schemes designed for earlier understandings of technologies. They
may also require responses by multiple agencies operating under
different bodies of law.12 The pace of scientific developments is
occurring much faster than traditional regulation can typically
respond.13 There are calls for flexibility and adaptability to allow the
technologies to evolve.14 Continued research is necessary to develop
new, potentially beneficial uses for the technology, but the research
also creates unknown risks. The technology is widely accessible,
allowing individual research labs to create and release edited
organisms with potentially wide-ranging impacts.15 Nonbinding soft
10. Charleston Noble et al., Current CRISPR Gene Drive Systems Are Likely to Be
Highly Invasive in Wild Populations, 7 ELIFE, no. e33423, June 19, 2018, at 1, 1.
11. COMM. ON GENE DRIVE RESEARCH IN NON-HUMAN ORGANISMS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, &
MED., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON: ADVANCING SCIENCE, NAVIGATING
UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING RESEARCH WITH PUBLIC VALUES 149 (2016)
[hereinafter GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON] (“[D]ifficult questions of [gene drive]
governance [arise], e.g., who should make decisions, who should be consulted, who is
accountable to whom, and how liability should be handled as a legal matter.”).
12. See, e.g., Igor Linkov et al., Comparative, Collaborative, and Integrative Risk
Governance for Emerging Technologies, 38 ENV’T SYSTEMS & DECISIONS 170, 171 (2018)
(“[A]n innovation often challenges several policy areas that are used to operating in silos,
whereas innovation may require more flexible, adaptive, and integrated approaches.”);
Gregory N. Mandel & Gary E. Marchant, The Living Regulatory Challenges of Synthetic
Biology, 100 IOWA L. REV. 155, 162 (2014) (“Regulatory systems, almost always, are
designed for technologies existing at the time of the regulatory systems’ formation and are
based on the then-current understanding of that technology. Such systems often face
difficulty and disruption when applied to newly emerging technologies.”).
13. Rachel Wynberg & Sarah A. Laird, Fast Science and Sluggish Policy: The
Herculean Task of Regulating Biodiscovery, 36 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 1 (2018).
The Convention on Biological Diversity has only recently settled on a definition for
synthetic biology and is still assessing how the convention applies to gene editing.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Synthetic Biology,
¶ 4, CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/17 (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop13/cop-13-dec-17-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCL7-LGD4] (defining synthetic biology as “a
further development and new dimension of modern biotechnology that combines science,
technology and engineering to facilitate and accelerate the understanding, design,
redesign, manufacture and/or modification of genetic materials, living organisms and
biological systems”).
14. See, e.g., Linkov et al., supra note 12, at 171.
15. See, e.g., Brooke Borel & Quanta, When Evolution Fights Back Against Genetic
Engineering, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/
2016/09/gene-drives/499574/ [https://perma.cc/7J8T-KCYS] (noting that scientists can now
“order the essential biological tools on the internet and build a working gene drive in mere
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law measures, such as professional standards and codes of conduct,
will play important roles in overseeing research and development of
CRISPR-edited organisms. Gene editing implicates diverse and deepseated values, but engaging a broad range of stakeholders is difficult.
Developers seek rapid regulatory approval for releasing new
genetically engineered (“GE”) organisms.
Experts continue to debate the proper role of risk as the primary
governance criteria, the role of the precautionary principle, and the
ethics of intentional eradication of certain species while engaging in
de-extinction for others.16 This Article argues that, while current
conservation laws do not directly address many of the specific
questions that arise with CRISPR, the ESA framework can, and
should, guide the use of gene editing.17 The ESA affirms the intrinsic
value of species conservation, prohibits harming or killing members
of protected species, and provides regulatory tools to help species and
their habitats recover.18 Using the ESA as a model for CRISPR
governance would not require a blanket prohibition on the use of
gene editing when extinction is a possible outcome. There are
compelling public health and ecological arguments for using the
technique. For example, the ESA exempts pest insects and invasive
species,19 and an ESA-based framework for biotechnology
governance could allow exemptions to achieve public health and
conservation goals.

weeks”); Antonio Regalado, The Extinction Invention, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601213/the-extinction-invention/ [https://perma.cc/5AAQ5SJ8] (“[W]ith CRISPR, even a two-person team could, in theory, change an entire
species.”).
16. See, e.g., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 10, 78 (“There is
insufficient evidence available at this time to support the release of gene-drive modified
organisms into the environment.”); Austin Burt et al., Open Letter: Research on Gene
Drive Technology Can Benefit Conservation and Public Health, OUTREACH NETWORK
FOR GENE DRIVE RES. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://genedrivenetwork.org/open-letter
[https://perma.cc/9L85-6WQ7] (opposing a proposed ban on gene drive research); Richard
Conniff, Should Genetic Engineering Be Used as a Tool for Conservation?, YALE ENV’T
360 (July 20, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/should-new-genetic-engineering-beused-as-a-conservation-tool [https://perma.cc/L339-FB55] (noting concerns about using
gene editing for conservation).
17. This Article focuses on domestic biotechnology governance, but it is important to
note that critical gaps also exist at the international level. Laboratories across the globe
are utilizing the technology and gene-editing developments made in one country that may
affect many other countries. See generally Noble et al., supra note 10 (describing such
developments).
18. See infra Section II.A.
19. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents three general
categories for understanding the interaction between gene editing and
species viability: population management, conservation, and broader
ecosystem impacts. Part II provides an overview of the key U.S.
governance tools that apply to gene editing: the ESA, the
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology
Governance (“Coordinated Framework”), and nonregulatory
measures that guide research and development. Part III proposes
steps to incorporate an ESA-based framework into U.S.
biotechnology governance. The framework would restrict some uses
of gene editing, but it does not stifle continued research, and it targets
gene-editing efforts on the most critical public health challenges.
I. GENE EDITING AND SPECIES VIABILITY
The recent advances in gene-editing techniques allow scientists
to create new organisms, modify existing organisms, and eradicate
unwanted species. Research is underway to apply these techniques to
eliminate disease vectors, control invasive species, expand the genetic
pools for endangered species, help species migrate, and recreate
extinct species. The range of potential uses for gene editing highlights
the governance challenges, as each potential use of gene-editing
techniques raises distinct legal, ecological, and ethical issues. This part
identifies three broad categories where gene editing and species
viability intersect: reducing populations via gene editing, utilizing
gene editing as a tool for conservation, and fostering broad ecosystem
impacts.
A. Population Management
According to the World Health Organization, there were
approximately 219 million malaria cases and 435,000 malaria deaths
in 2017.20 Dengue fever is a threat for almost half of the world’s
population, and “[s]evere dengue is a leading cause of serious illness
and death among children in some Asian and Latin American
countries.”21 The same mosquito that transmits dengue can also

20. Malaria: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 19, 2018),
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malaria [https://perma.cc/295A-UKPL].
21. Dengue and Severe Dengue: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 13, 2018),
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dengue-and-severe-dengue [https://perma.cc/
XEL3-83L8].
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transmit the Zika virus.22 As of 2018, eighty-six countries and
territories have reported instances of mosquito-transmitted Zika
infection.23 Malaria is treatable, but the cost of eradication using
conventional methods is prohibitive.24 Treatments do not currently
exist for dengue25 or Zika.26 The mosquitos are also increasingly
resistant to pesticides, complicating population management.27
Controlling or eliminating disease vectors via CRISPR is the
focus of much early-stage research and offers perhaps the most
beneficial use of biotechnology to reduce or eliminate species
populations.28 Population management via gene editing may take
different forms. Gene edits may cause sterility in the modified
organisms, cause the modified organism to produce only male
offspring, or prevent a modified organism’s offspring from reaching
sexual maturity.29 Each of these options affect the targeted organisms,
and perhaps their immediate offspring, but the genetic modifications
do not spread throughout a population. For example, sterile insect
techniques that prevent GE organisms or their offspring from
reproducing depend upon repeated releases of the modified
organism.30 Such techniques may allow scientists to manage negative
22. Mosquito Control: Can It Stop Zika at Source?, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/zika-virus/articles/mosquito-control/en/ [https://perma.cc/
UD3U-LYW5] (last updated Feb. 17, 2019).
23. Zika Virus: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 20, 2018),
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/zika-virus [https://perma.cc/M6EW-KA49].
24. See Danielle Renwick, Can Malaria Be Eradicated?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/can-malaria-be-eradicated [https://perma.cc/
ACH3-HS5G] (citing a Gates Foundation estimate that malaria eradication “would cost
between $90 billion and $120 billion”).
25. Dengue and Severe Dengue: Key Facts, supra note 21.
26. Zika Virus: Key Facts, supra note 23.
27. Zach N. Adelman & Zhijian Tu, Control of Mosquito-Borne Infectious Diseases:
Sex and Gene Drive, 32 TRENDS PARASITOLOGY 219, 219 (2016).
28. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 5 (“Some of the fundamental
reasons to conduct gene drive research include widely shared commitments to fighting
human disease, promoting human welfare, and protecting and restoring the natural
environment.”); Andrew Hammond et al., A CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Drive System Targeting
Female Reproduction in the Malaria Mosquito Vector Anopheles Gambiae, 34 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 78, 78 (2016); see, e.g., Adelman & Tu, supra note 27, at 219 (“Given
recent breakthroughs in the development of CRISPR-Cas9 reagents as a source of gene
drive, more advanced technologies . . . may represent efficient and self-limiting methods to
control mosquito populations.”).
29. Adelman & Tu, supra note 27, at 219, 222; Nikolay P. Kandul et al., Transforming
Insect Population Control with Precision Guided Sterile Males with Demonstration in Flies,
10 NATURE COMM., no. 84, Jan. 8, 2019, at 1, 1.
30. Conventional sterile insect techniques rely on radiation to sterilize male pest
insects. Diamondback Moth Project at Cornell University in 2015, SHELTON LAB (Jun. 17,
2015),
http://shelton.entomology.cornell.edu/2015/06/17/cornell-dbm-project-2015/
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long-term impacts.31 If the genetic modification is not effective or
leads to unanticipated impacts, the next release could be canceled or
altered.
Gene drives, by contrast, are genetic alterations intended to
spread throughout a population of rapidly reproducing organisms
after the initial release.32 For example, scientists could use a gene
drive to spread a genetic alteration through populations of Aedes
aegypti and Aedes albopictus mosquitos (dengue vectors) to prevent
generations of mosquitos from transmitting the dengue virus.33 Gene
drives could quickly affect populations far beyond the target area,
thus magnifying concerns about irreversible impacts.34 Research is
underway to develop gene drive techniques that are reversible or that
phase out over time, but these techniques are still in the experimental
phase.35
The same gene-editing techniques that could target disease
vectors may also control agricultural pests and invasive species.36
Reducing pest insects could prevent billions of dollars in annual
damage to crops and potentially lead to a dramatic reduction in the
use of chemical pesticides.37 Billions of dollars are also spent each
[https://perma.cc/8A6K-7VZR]. The sterilized insects are then released to mate with local
females of the same species, preventing offspring. Id. “[T]his reduces the pest population
over time with multiple releases.” Id. Replacing radiation with advanced genetic
engineering allows more precise modifications and thus could be more effective than
conventional methods. See id.
31. See, e.g., Kelly E. Ormond et al., Human Germline Genome Editing, 101 AM. J.
HUM. ETHICS 167, 169 (2017).
32. See, e.g., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 149; Douglas W.
Drury et al., CRISPR/Cas9 Gene Drives in Genetically Variable and Nonrandomly Mating
Wild Populations, 3 SCI. ADVANCES, no. e1601910, May 19, 2017, at 1, 1 (“Gene drives
work by segregation distortion or ‘super Mendelian’ inheritance, wherein heterozygous
individuals either transmit a desired gene in >90% of their gametes instead of the 50%
Mendelian expectation or are transformed into homozygotes.”); Kyros Kyrou et al., A
CRISPR–Cas9 Gene Drive Targeting Doublesex Causes Complete Population Suppression
in Caged Anopheles Gambiae Mosquitoes, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1062, 1062–66
(2018) (describing a gene drive experiment).
33. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 50–52.
34. Kevin M. Esvelt & Neil J. Gemmell, Conservation Demands Safe Gene Drive, 15
PLOS BIOLOGY, no. e2003850, Nov. 16, 2017, at 1, 2 (“[Gene] drive systems lack control
mechanisms and are consequently highly invasive.”); Noble et al., supra note 10, at 1.
35. See, e.g., John M. Marshall & Omar S. Akbari, Can CRISPR-Based Gene Drive Be
Confined in the Wild? A Question for Molecular and Population Biology, 13 ACS
CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 424, 424 (2018); Kevin M. Esvelt, Daisy Drive Systems, SCULPTING
EVOLUTION, http://www.sculptingevolution.org/daisydrives [https://perma.cc/327R-FSE2]
(describing daisy drive systems).
36. Raul F. Medina, Gene Drives and the Management of Agricultural Pests, 5 J.
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION S255, S256–57 (2017).
37. Brooke Borel, When the Pesticides Run Out, 543 NATURE 302, 303–04 (2017).
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year to control invasive species in the United States.38 An interagency
effort is underway to evaluate the role of biotechnology in invasive
species management.39 A 2017 Invasive Species Advisory Committee
report identified the following examples of advanced biotechnology
applications for managing invasive species: utilizing the sterile insect
technique to address insects such as a mosquito species endangering
Hawaiian birds; releasing GE insects that are unable to carry diseases;
modifying native species to make them more resistant to nonnative
diseases; and enhancing crops to help them resist insect pests.40
Gene editing could also target a wide range of insects, plants, and
animals that are not disease vectors, agricultural pests, or invasive
species.41 There is a lucrative pest control industry in the United
States.42 Without regulatory limitations, the same techniques used to
control harmful organisms could also target pests that are nuisances
to humans, livestock, or landscaping but do not pose infectious
disease concerns. This potentially expansive use of gene editing
highlights the need for deliberate, early, and effective guidance on the
various potential uses of CRISPR.
B.

Conservation

The Earth is in the midst of the sixth mass extinction and the first
that is caused primarily by human activity.43 The rapid pace of climate

38. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE COST OF INVASIVE SPECIES 1 (2012),
https://www.fws.gov/verobeach/pythonpdf/costofinvasivesfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M7PU-92YB]; see also R. ELIOT CRAFTON & SAHAR ANGADJIVAND, CONG. RES. SERV.,
IF11011, INVASIVE SPECIES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 2 (2018).
39. Nat’l Invasive Species Council, Technology Innovation, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR,
https://www.doi.gov/invasivespecies/technology-innovation [https://perma.cc/5CZD-UMVW].
40. INVASIVE SPECIES ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
ADVANCED BIOTECHNOLOGY TOOLS FOR INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT 1–2
(2017), https://edit.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/isac_advanced_biotechnology_white_
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/9522-ZQB7].
41. Jonas J. Monast, Editing Nature: Reconceptualizing Biotechnology Governance, 59
B.C. L. REV. 2377, 2400 (2018).
42. Id.
43. Wolfgang Cramer et al., Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY PART A:
GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 979, 990 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014),
https://ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-PartA_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SWY2-5LK7] (“Across the world, species extinctions are at or above the highest rates of
species extinction in the fossil record.”); Gerardo Ceballos, Paul R. Ehrlich & Rodolfo
Dirzo, Biological Annihilation via the Ongoing Sixth Mass Extinction Signaled by
Vertebrate Population Losses and Declines, 114 PNAS E6089, E6095 (2017); Ian Johnston,
Humans are Ushering in the Sixth Mass Extinction of Life on Earth, Scientists Warn,
INDEPENDENT (May 31, 2017, 17:00), https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/mass-
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change will likely exacerbate the pace of extinction by creating
additional habitat pressures for some threatened species and placing
many others at risk. Species most at risk are those that have limited
range, require a unique habitat, and have a low population density.44
Biotechnology could provide a potential solution for some of
these conservation challenges. In some instances, changing the
genetic code of threatened or endangered species may expand
suitable habitats by changing reactions to temperature or increasing
resistance to diseases.45 Gene editing may also bolster recovery efforts
for species that experience a significant drop in population and thus
have a limited genetic pool.46
Invasive species management also has implications for
conservation.47 Nonnative rodents, pigs, snakes, plants, and microbes
have caused population collapses and forced displacement of native
species.48 However, the link between invasive species management
and conservation is not cut and dry. For example, established invasive
species may replace the ecological function of native species.49
Climate change will further complicate the distinction between native
and invasive species as habitats change and species migrate.

extinction-humans-causing-earth-deaths-end-times-warning-a7765856.html [https://perma.cc/
6RUB-LHK7].
44. Habiba Gitay et al., Ecosystems and Their Goods and Services, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTION, AND VULNERABILITY 235, 271 (James J. McCarthy
et al. eds., 2001), https://ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/WGII_TAR_full_report-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9VZ-UKAB].
45. Megan A. Supple & Beth Shapiro, Conservation of Biodiversity in the Genomics
Era, 19 GENOME BIOLOGY, no. 131, Sept. 11, 2018, 1, 9–10.
46. Jeff A. Johnson et al., Is There a Future for Genome-Editing Technologies in
Conservation?, 19 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 97, 98 (2016). For example, scientists are
exploring the use of CRISPR to make cacao trees more resistant to fungi and viruses.
Laura Geggel, Can Gene Editing Save the World’s Chocolate?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-gene-editing-save-the-worlds-chocolate/
[https://perma.cc/3L5K-FWJ4].
47. Karl J. Campbell et al., The Next Generation of Rodent Eradications: Innovative
Technologies and Tools to Improve Species Specificity and Increase Their Feasibility on
Islands, 185 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 47, 51 (2015) (noting the potential for
CRISPR-enabled gene drives to control invasive rodents); Antonio Regalado, First Gene
Drive in Mammals Could Aid Vast New Zealand Eradication Plan, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb.
10, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603533/first-gene-drive-in-mammals-couldaid-vast-new-zealand-eradication-plan/ [https://perma.cc/X463-5K7F].
48. Jessica Gurevitch & Dianna K. Padilla, Are Invasive Species a Major Cause of
Extinctions?, 19 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 470, 470 (2004); see also Invasive
Species: Endangered Species Program, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/
invasives/endangered-species.html [https://perma.cc/DER3-E2EQ].
49. Medina, supra note 36, at S257.
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De-extinction is another conservation-focused use for geneediting technologies.50 CRISPR allows scientists to alter the DNA of
living organisms to give their offspring traits of extinct species. For
example, efforts are underway to alter the DNA of band-tailed
pigeons to create offspring resembling extinct passenger pigeons.51
The result is a hybrid species rather than an exact replica of the
extinct species, and the process raises a host of ethical questions
regarding the purpose of de-extinction, obligations to reintroduced
organisms, and implications for species conservation generally.52 As
Professor Alejandro Camacho notes, reintroducing extinct species
could bolster ecosystem health by restoring an organism that plays a
particularly important role in the local ecosystem, or the process
could hamper conservation efforts by imposing new costs and risks.53
C.

Broader Ecosystem Impacts

The previous two sections discuss changes targeted at particular
organisms and locations. Gene editing may also foster broader
ecosystem impacts since altering individual organisms may also alter
the ecosystems in which they live.54 Some ecosystem changes may be
deliberate, such as increasing a species’s resilience to climate
change.55 Gene editing could also lead to unintentional ecosystem
impacts, such as allowing new species to outcompete native
organisms.56 Gene editing could therefore cause invasive species
50. Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-Extinction, Dualisms, and
Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 849, 858 (2015).
51. De-Extinction Defined, REVIVE & RESTORE, https://reviverestore.org/passengerpigeon-de-extinction/ [https://perma.cc/N763-N5HJ].
52. See Gregory E. Kaebnick & Bruce Jennings, De-extinction and Conservation,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2017, at S2, S3–S4 (discussing the ethical considerations
presented by de-extinction).
53. Camacho, supra note 50, at 856–59; see also Norman C. Ellstrand et al., Got
Hybridization? A Multidisciplinary Approach for Informing Science Policy, 60
BIOSCIENCE 384, 385 (2010) (“[H]ybridization with the introduced mallard is the major
conservation problem facing the endangered Hawaiian duck, and has led to its probable
extirpation on the islands of Oahu and Hawaii.”).
54. James E. DiCarlo et al., Safeguarding CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Drives in Yeast, 33
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1250, 1250 (2015) (noting that gene drives create the risk that
“unintended genome editing occurring through the escape of strains from laboratories,
coupled with the prospect of unanticipated ecological change, demands caution”).
55. See, e.g., Rachel A. Levin et al., Engineering Strategies to Decode and Enhance the
Genomes of Coral Symbionts, 8 FRONTIERS MICROBIOLOGY, no. 1220, June 30, 2017, at 1,
2.
56. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 5 (“[U]sing a gene drive to
suppress a non-native weed population may lead to unexpected consequences, such as the
loss of habitat for native species or even the establishment of a second, more resilient
invasive species.”); Kent H. Redford, William Adams & Georgina M. Mace, Synthetic

97 N.C. L. REV. 1329 (2019)

1340

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

challenges in some areas, even as the technique helps eradicate
invasive species in others.57
The extent to which gene drives would have lasting impacts on
target populations or ecosystems remains unclear. For example, a
2018 study evaluating the potential ecosystem impacts of eradicating
the Anopheles gambiae mosquito—one of the primary vectors
responsible for spreading malaria in Africa—concluded that there are
no ecosystem functions that are unique to the species.58 According to
one of the authors of the study, there are traits of the species that
limit its role in ecosystem viability.59
These results are encouraging for infectious disease control, but
they also point to the importance of rigorous analysis for each
potential use of gene drives. Other mosquito species may play more
important roles in their respective ecosystems, but U.S. law does not
limit gene drives to mosquito species that carry critical infectious
diseases.60 There is a lucrative pest control industry in the United
States.61 Without regulatory limitations, the temptation may be too
great to deploy gene drives to manage pests that are nuisances to
humans, livestock, or landscaping but do not pose infectious disease
concerns. This result may not be a cause of concern, and may even be
desirable, but actions where extinction is a likely outcome should not
be governed by the market alone. Lawmakers should establish
safeguards requiring rigorous studies of potential impacts, similar to
the work currently underway to assess the use of gene drives to target
mosquito-borne diseases.62 Society needs access to information that
allows informed opinions about the technology and meaningful
opportunities to influence governance choices.
Biology and Conservation of Nature: Wicked Problems and Wicked Solutions, 11 PLOS
BIOLOGY, no. e1001530, Apr. 2, 2013, at 1, 2 tbl.1.
57. Redford et al., supra note 56, at 2 tbl.1 (noting that genetically modified organisms
“may promote invasive capabilities (or novel organisms may be invasive)”).
58. C. M. Collins et al., Effects of the Removal or Reduction in Density of the Malaria
Mosquito, Anopheles gambiae s.I., on Interacting Predators and Competitors in Local
Ecosystems, 33 MED. & VETERINARY ENTOMOLOGY 1, 10–11 (2018).
59. Hayley Dunning, Removing Malaria-Carrying Mosquitoes Unlikely to Affect
Ecosystems, Says Report, IMPERIAL C. LONDON (July 26, 2018), https://www.imperial.ac.uk/
news/187427/removing-malariacarrying-mosquitoes-unlikely-affect-ecosystems/ [https://perma.cc/
9R6M-66NB] (“As adults, An. gambiae mosquitoes are small, hard to catch, most mobile at
night and not very juicy, so they are not a rewarding prey for both insect and vertebrate
predators. Many do eat them -- sometimes accidentally -- but there is no evidence that
they are a big or vital part of the diet of any other animal.”).
60. See infra Section II.B.
61. Pest Management Industry Fact Sheet, NAT’L PEST MGMT. ASS’N,
https://npmapestworld.org/newsroom/industry-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/J562-GA7K].
62. See Noble et al., supra note 10, at 2.
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Researchers are utilizing computer models to evaluate the
likelihood of a gene drive spreading throughout a population.63
Perhaps predictably at the early stage of CRISPR-enabled gene
drives, the models are producing conflicting projections. For example,
recent analysis by leading scientists involved in developing gene drive
techniques suggests that gene drives released into wild populations
could quickly spread well beyond the target area.64 Another study
released around the same time reaches a starkly different conclusion,
projecting that resistance to the gene drive would “evolve almost
inevitably in most natural populations” unless there are further
interventions.65
The rapid spread of gene drives could be beneficial or harmful
depending on the goals of the biotechnology efforts. Rapid spread
could also contribute to disease eradication efforts, for example.
Alternatively, it could undermine efforts to control invasive species in
some areas without affecting the target species’s viability. The
divergent potential outcomes are a fundamental challenge for
scientists developing gene drive mechanisms and government officials
considering whether to approve the use of gene drives. The actual
impacts of a gene drive will not be certain until field trials take place,
a point at which it may be difficult or impossible to reverse
unintended results.66
II. GOVERNING THE ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF GENE EDITING
Current U.S. law governing biotechnology generally focuses on
risk to humans and agriculture rather than broader ecosystem

63. See, e.g., id. (presenting results of a mathematical model exploring the potential
spread of gene drives); see also Philip A. Eckhoff et al., Impact of Mosquito Gene Drive on
Malaria Elimination in a Computational Model with Explicit Spatial and Temporal
Dynamics, 114 PNAS E255, E255 (2017) (presenting results of a “mathematical model to
simulate . . . gene drive approach[es] in a variety of sub-Saharan African settings”).
64. Noble et al., supra note 10, at 2.
65. Robert L. Unckless, Andrew G. Clark & Philipp W. Messer, Evolution of
Resistance Against CRISPR/Cas9 Gene Drive, 205 GENETICS 827, 827 (2017). There are
additional risks beyond the potential for rapid population collapse of the targeted species.
Gene drives could impact nontargeted organisms via cross-breeding or lateral gene
transfer. Kenneth A. Oye et al., Regulating Gene Drives, 345 SCIENCE 626, 626–27 (2014).
Lateral gene transfer refers to “transmission of DNA . . . between different genomes.”
Kara
Rogers,
Horizontal
Gene
Transfer,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/science/horizontal-gene-transfer [https://perma.cc/QJ7Q-X726]
(last updated Nov. 30, 2018).
66. See, e.g., Borel & Quanta, supra note 15 (noting that scientists are relying on
computer modeling to assess gene drive impacts because they “have no experience
engineering systems that are going to evolve outside of our control”).
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impacts.67 CRISPR, however, requires a broader approach to address
the scope of potential uses for the technology.68 The technology is a
relatively recent breakthrough, and scientists are still discovering its
expansive possibilities.69 The technology promises profound societal
benefits, including the disease eradication and conservation efforts
described in Part I. It also places tremendous power in the hands of
the scientists working with CRISPR.70 Whether or not the technology
delivers upon its promise, however, is up in the air. Current laws were
not designed to address the fundamental questions regarding when
and how humans should use genetics to redesign ecosystems.
The uncertainty about CRISPR’s impacts, combined with the
relatively low cost, simplicity, and precision of the technology, bring
biotechnology governance questions into sharp relief. For example,
when is it appropriate to use gene editing to reduce species
populations or foster extinction? When is de-extinction or species
enhancement appropriate? What governance standards apply? How
do distinctions between native versus nonnative or natural versus
nonnatural apply to gene-edited organisms? What is the proper role
of government regulation versus nonbinding soft law governance?
The United States does not have a consistent approach when it
comes to species preservation and eradication. On the one hand,
Congress has enacted numerous laws aimed at preventing extinction
domestically and internationally.71 On the other hand, federal and
state policies encourage management of disease-carrying insects,
invasive species, and insects and animals that harm crops and
67. See infra Section II.B.
68. Monast, supra note 41, at 2381–82 (advocating for a broader approach to
biotechnology governance that balances competing societal values).
69. Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier coauthored a seminal paper in
2012 about CRISPR and gene editing. For a review of that paper, see generally Martin
Jinek et al., A Programmable Dual-RNA–Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive
Bacterial Immunity, 337 SCIENCE 816 (2012).
70. See, e.g., Michael Specter, Rewriting the Code of Life, NEW YORKER, Jan. 2, 2017,
at 34 (quoting MIT professor Kevin Esvelt as telling an audience that “as a single scientist,
I can alter an organism in a laboratory that will have more of an effect on all your lives
than anything the [Massachusetts] legislature . . . can do”).
71. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012); Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (2012) (recognizing that threatened or endangered
“species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people”); African Elephant
Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4203 (2012) (supporting elephant conservation
programs); Wild Exotic Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4902 (2012) (restricting
international trade of exotic birds and encouraging conservation programs); Rhinoceros
and Tiger Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012) (supporting conservation of
rhinoceros and tigers).
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livestock.72 Although this approach endorses efforts to eradicate
harmful organisms, it does not endorse species extinction. The laws
were enacted long before the development of modern gene-editing
techniques.73 The prospect of widescale impacts and the conflicting
approaches to species eradication leave federal regulators without
proper guidance for forthcoming proposals to release gene-edited
organisms.74
This part describes two key sources of biotechnology and
conservation governance: the ESA and the Coordinated Framework.
Together, this collection of law and implementing regulations create
the default approach for overseeing the intersection of gene editing
and species viability in the United States.
A. Endangered Species Act
The ESA is the cornerstone of U.S. legal measures to prevent
extinction and establishes the principle that plant and animal species
have “esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value to the Nation and its people.”75 With the exception of
pest insects and invasive species, the statute creates a legal regime to
protect individual members of a vulnerable species and includes an
expansive list of prohibited actions involving a member of a protected
species.76 Private landowners may face restrictions on the use of
property that is designated as a “critical habitat” for a protected
species.77 Federal agencies whose actions may impact listed species
72. See, e.g., Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).
73. For example, the ESA was first enacted by Congress in 1973. Endangered Species
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–
1544 (2012)).
74. See, e.g., INVASIVE SPECIES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 40, at 3 (“[I]nvasive
species applications represent a divergence from the types of products and private sector
applicants with which the regulatory agencies have traditionally dealt.”).
75. § 1531(a)(3); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PROPOSAL TO PERMIT THE FIELD RELEASE
OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED DIAMONDBACK MOTH IN NEW YORK:
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, JUNE 2017, at 69 (2017) (“[The ESA] is one of the most
far-reaching wildlife conservation laws ever enacted by any nation.”).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012) (prohibiting the “tak[ing]” of an endangered species).
The ESA defines “take” as including the following actions: “harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”
Id. § 1532(19); see also id. § 1532(6) (exempting from the definition of “endangered
species” any “species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest
whose protection under the provisions of this [Act] would present an overwhelming and
overriding risk to man”). The law defines “endangered species” as one “in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Id. A “threatened species”
is “likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or
a significant portion of its range.” Id. § 1532(20).
77. See id. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i).
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must consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) or National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) to
determine whether the actions may proceed.78 Violations of the ESA
may result in civil and criminal penalties.79
At this stage, it is unclear the extent to which the ESA will
influence the deployment of gene editing. Some of the uncertainty
rests with questions about the viability of the ESA itself. The ESA is
perennially controversial due primarily to land use restrictions
necessary to protect critical habitats and the costs associated with
limiting economic activity when a protected species is present.80 To
date, the ESA has weathered repeated congressional efforts to repeal
or weaken the law,81 but the Trump administration may succeed in
restricting the reach of the ESA where past efforts have failed.82 In
July 2018, the Department of Commerce proposed regulatory
changes to allow agencies to consider the economic impacts of listing
a species as threatened or endangered.83 If implemented, the new
regulations would significantly restrict the reach of the ESA and
could potentially favor the use of genetic engineering for population
management if doing so were more cost effective than other
measures.84
Challenges to the ESA extend beyond current regulatory
proposals. The FWS and NMFS consistently face long backlogs of
78. See id. § 1536(a)(2); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118,
1125 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the NMFS is, along with the FWS, a service that an
agency may be required to coordinate with under § 1536(a)(2)).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)–(b) (2012).
80. See, e.g., PERVAZE A. SHEIKH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33309,
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA): A COMPARISON OF
PENDING BILLS AND A PROPOSED AMENDMENT WITH CURRENT LAW 1 (2006).
81. See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (describing three bills introduced in 2006 to amend ESA
implementation); see also M. LYNNE CORN & KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42945, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) IN THE 113TH CONGRESS: NEW
AND RECURRING ISSUES 17–18 (2014) (describing proposed amendments to the ESA
during the 113th Congress).
82. Lisa Friedman, Kendra Pierre-Louis & Livia Albeck-Ripka, Law That Saved the
Bald Eagle Could Be Vastly Reworked, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/climate/endangered-species-act-changes.html
[https://perma.cc/H6UM-RCL5 (dark archive)] (referring to the Trump administration’s
proposal as “the most sweeping set of changes in decades to the Endangered Species
Act”).
83. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the Regulations for
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 83 Fed. Reg. 35,193, 35,194–95 (proposed
July 25, 2018) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).
84. See id.; see also ESA Implementation: Regulation Revisions, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_ESA/regulation-revisions.html
[https://perma.cc/XX8A-R3SA] (last updated Aug. 14, 2018).
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species awaiting a listing determination.85 Furthermore, ESA
protections are not automatic. In order for the ESA to apply, the
FWS or NMFS must determine whether the species is threatened or
endangered and, if so, how to respond.86 The agencies have discretion
when deciding whether listing is appropriate.87 Government officials
may also conclude that listing is warranted but delay the decision if
listing would interfere with the agency’s ability to protect other
priority species.88
It is not clear how federal agencies will apply this discretion
when considering a genetically modified organism. The statute does
not specify how similar genetic codes of protected and modified
species must be in order for protections to apply to both.89 It does,
however, allow protections to extend to species that “closely
resemble[] in appearance, at the point in question, a species which has
been listed pursuant to such section that enforcement personnel
would have substantial difficulty in attempting to differentiate
between the listed and unlisted species.”90 The law also includes
provisions for protecting “experimental populations,” such as a
species that has recovered via captive breeding and is subsequently
released into the wild.91
Other questions about the ESA’s application to GE organisms
arise because Congress implemented the ESA before the recent
advances in biotechnology and thus did not contemplate the use of
genetic engineering to drive species to extinction. First, the law does
not apply prospectively. The listing process only becomes an option
after the population collapse is underway.92 Deliberate steps to
initiate population collapse via a gene drive, therefore, would not
trigger ESA protections until the gene drive spread throughout a
population.
Second, the law presumes that extinction is gradual, allowing
federal regulators time to engage in a lengthy regulatory process of
85. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 280–81 (1993).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)–(b) (2012).
87. Id. § 1533(a)(2)(A)–(C) (noting the agency discretion in the listing process).
88. See id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii); see also 50 C.F.R. §§ 424.14(a)–(b), (c)(3), 424.10
(2018) (“The Secretary may . . . change the listed status of a species . . . .”).
89. See Norman F. Carlin, Ilan Wurman & Tamara Zakim, How to Permit Your
Mammoth: Some Legal Implications of “De-Extinction,” 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 22
(2013).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e)(A) (2012).
91. 50 C.F.R. § 17.81(a) (2018).
92. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (listing factors for determining whether a
species is threatened or endangered).
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studying the threats to the species, formally listing the species as
threatened or endangered, and implementing protections.93 Gene
drives could initiate rapid population collapses before the completion
of the listing process. Not only would the ESA fail to prohibit the
initial release of the gene drive, but federal officials may also be
unable to respond, even if they are able to complete the listing
process, if the threat to the species is a genetic trait explicitly designed
to spread through the population.94
Third, the ESA presumes that habitat is static and that protected
habitat should focus on a species’s native range.95 Habitat loss is the
dominant threat for many vulnerable species,96 and the problem will
only get worse as the impacts of climate change take root. Some flora
and fauna will migrate as temperatures rise.97 Species that are unable
to migrate, or that depend on a particular type of habitat that is no
longer available, will perish unless there are new interventions.98 Even
in the absence of gene editing, dynamic habitat changes will
exacerbate regulatory and political pressures on ESA habitat
protections.99 Genetically altering species could exacerbate the legal,
ecological, and social challenges if the changes help a species migrate.
B.

The Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology

Due to the limited reach of the ESA, federal regulators depend
on existing statutes focused on human health, pest management, and
environmental impacts to address the intersection of conservation
93. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (“The Secretary shall make [listing] determinations . . . solely
on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to him after conducting a
review of the status of the species and after taking into account those efforts, if any, being
made by any State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a State or foreign
nation, to protect such species, whether by predator control, protection of habitat and
food supply, or other conservation practices, within any area under its jurisdiction; or on
the high seas.”).
94. Monast, supra note 41, at 2409; see also Noble et al., supra note 10, at 2 (discussing
the likelihood that gene drives would spread wild populations).
95. Camacho, supra note 50, at 870–71, 885. The native versus nonnative distinction
frequently appears in wildlife management laws. Id. at 892.
96. Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms
in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 233 (1998).
97. Craig Welch, Half of All Species Are on the Move—And We’re Feeling It, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 27, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/04/climate-changespecies-migration-disease/ [https://perma.cc/B9WD-X4LC]; see also Ben A. Minteer &
James P. Collins, Move It or Lose It? The Ecological Ethics of Relocating Species Under
Climate Change, 20 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1801, 1801 (2010).
98. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to
the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2008).
99. See id. at 27–29.
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and gene editing. The Coordinated Framework divides primary
jurisdiction over nonhuman uses of biotechnology among three
agencies: the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the United
States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), and the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”).100 The FDA regulates animal drugs and
foods derived from plants and oversees genetic engineering aimed at
controlling infectious diseases.101 The USDA’s jurisdiction centers on
animal and plant pests.102 GE animals are subject to USDA regulation
if they present a risk to livestock health.103 GE insects may also be
subject to USDA oversight if there is a risk the insects could spread
livestock diseases, affect crops, or spread noxious weeds.104 The
EPA’s role in biotechnology governance focuses primarily on
pesticides and toxic materials.105
The Coordinated Framework does not provide a comprehensive
system for responding to potential ecological impacts of GE
organisms.106 Because the primary statutes informing biotechnology
governance do not directly address ecological considerations, the
agencies rely primarily on the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) to assess the environmental impacts of major federal
actions.107 NEPA serves an important function by requiring entities to

100. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302,
23,302 (June 26, 1986); OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, MODERNIZING THE REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
PRODUCTS: FINAL VERSION OF THE 2017 UPDATE TO THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK
FOR THE REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 (2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B5W3-6WWY].
101. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(s)(2)(C), 360(b)
(2012); The Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(a), (i)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017);
OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, supra note 100, at 9, tbl.1.
102. See The Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701(2) (2012); The Animal Health
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 8302(14), 8304 (2012 & Supp. 2017). Other statutes granting
the USDA jurisdiction over aspects of genetic engineering include the Federal Meat
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2012) (defining secretary); id. § 602, and the Poultry
Products Inspection Act, id. § 451.
103. See 7 U.S.C. § 8303 (2012).
104. Id. §§ 8302–8303, 8305 (2012 & Supp. 2017) (animal health protection); see also id.
§ 7701 (2012) (finding the “detection, control, eradication” and prevention of the “spread
of plant pests or noxious weeds is necessary for the protection of the agriculture,
environment, and economy of the United States”).
105. See The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a
(2012); The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
106. Monast, supra note 41, at 2389–91, 2411.
107. See The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012); OFFICE
OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, supra note 100, at 21−22 (stating that both the USDA and FDA
still comply with NEPA requirements when they are applicable). NEPA only applies when
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collect data, evaluate potential environmental impacts, and provide
the public with an opportunity to submit comments prior to issuing a
final decision.108 The uncertainty presented by gene editing is
precisely the type of question that calls for the thorough investigation
required by NEPA. The statute, however, is procedural.109 Agencies
must evaluate the potential environmental impacts and justify why
they choose a particular course of action, but NEPA does not require
agencies to choose a particular course of action based on the
environmental impacts identified by the analysis.110
In 2016, the FDA and USDA each approved field trials for GE
insects designed to manage local populations.111 The FDA considered
the release of genetically modified Aedes aegypti mosquitoes—the
subspecies that carry Zika and dengue—on the island of Key Haven,
Florida.112 The USDA considered the release of a genetically
modified diamondback gypsy moth—a species that creates billiondollar damages to crops—at a test site in New York.113 In both
instances, the genetic modification causes offspring of modified male
insects to die before reaching sexual maturity.114 This biological
containment distinguishes the modified mosquitoes and moths at

a “major Federal action[]” has the potential to “significantly” impact the environment. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(v) (2012).
108. See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, supra note 100, at 22−23; see also Victor B.
Flatt, The “Worst Case” May Be the Best: Rethinking NEPA Law to Avoid Future
Environmental Disasters, 6 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 25, 32–36 (2011) (describing
the requirements of an environmental impact study under NEPA).
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); Flatt, supra note 108, at 32.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
111. See FDA, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI) IN SUPPORT OF A
PROPOSED FIELD TRIAL OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED (GE) MALE AEDES AEGYPTI
MOSQUITOES OF THE LINE OX513A IN KEY HAVEN, MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA
UNDER AN INVESTIGATIONAL NEW ANIMAL DRUG EXEMPTION 8 (2016) [hereinafter
FDA FONSI], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/UCM514699.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9DTQ7Z6]; U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., PROPOSAL TO PERMIT THE FIELD RELEASE OF
GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED DIAMONDBACK MOTH IN NEW YORK: ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 2016, at 1 (2016) [hereinafter DIAMONDBACK MOTH
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT], https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/16_076101r_pea.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4K9L-C2W5].
112. FDA, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR INVESTIGATIONAL USE OF AEDES
AEGYPTI OX513A, at 18–19 (2016) [hereinafter FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/UCM514698.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5FCLFA8].
113. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 10.
114. See id. at 64; FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 112, at
21–22.
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issue from gene drives designed to spread through multiple
generations.
The respective agencies conducted environmental assessments
(“EAs”) as required by NEPA. The EAs were limited to the impacts
of the field trials themselves rather than the broader implications if
the insects were eventually approved for commercial release.115 In
each instance, the agency concluded that there likely were no
significant environmental impacts that would result from the trials,
and thus in-depth environmental impact statements were
unnecessary.116 The conclusion that the release would not have a
significant impact rested on comparisons between the release of the
genetically modified insects and the use of conventional chemical
pesticides to control the insects, the geographic containment of the
modified insects, and the biological containment built into the trial
since the modified insects die without passing on the genetic
modifications to other members of the species.117 Because the trials
did not include gene drives, the agencies considering the proposed
field trials did not have to consider the prospect of uncontrolled
spread beyond the initial generation of released GE insects.
Both agencies identified endangered species and habitats that the
GE organism could potentially impact.118 The FDA concluded that
there would be minimal interaction and that genetic modifications
would not create a risk of harm from ingestion.119 The USDA
concluded that no endangered species were located near the test site;
that prevailing winds would not allow the modified insects to travel to
areas with endangered plants that may suffer harm from the moths;
115. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 65
(“[A]t the conclusion of the experimental release, the release site will be treated with a
pesticide” to “eliminate any remaining diamondback moths.”); FDA, FDA RELEASES
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MOSQUITO,
AUGUST 5, 2016 UPDATE (2016), https://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/newsevents/
cvmupdates/ucm490246.htm [https://perma.cc/XL9D-5JSJ] (“FDA’s finalization of the EA
and FONSI does not mean that Oxitec’s GE mosquitoes are approved for commercial
use.”).
116. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 11;
FDA FONSI, supra note 111, at 85.
117. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 64
(“[The] sterile insect technology in the GE diamondback moth strain . . . mitigates many of
the possible theoretical hazards and risks associated with insect genetic engineering.”);
FDA FONSI, supra note 111, at 8 (finding that after studying “[t]he consequences of
escape, survival, and establishment” the proposed field study “is not expected to cause any
significant adverse impacts on the environment”).
118. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 57–64;
FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 112, at 45–46, 91.
119. FDA FONSI, supra note 111, at 6–7.
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and, even if the insects did spread, the effects would not be different
from the nonmodified diamondback moths that already exist across
the country.120 The agency also determined that releasing the moths
may lead to environmental benefits by reducing the amount of
insecticides applied during the growing season.121 Harm to species
that prey on the insects was unlikely because the populations would
otherwise be controlled with pesticides and the preying species
consume other insects.122
The EAs for the GE moth and mosquito field trials considered
circumstances with a high level of confidence in geographic and
biological containment measures. Similar approaches for NEPA
analysis may not work in the gene drive context or when agencies
consider proposals for releasing multiple GE organisms in the same
ecosystems. Comparing the release of genetically modified organisms
with conventional pest management strategies, for example, will be
incomplete when the risks of spreading gene drives are unknown or
there are greater interactions between GE organisms. The focus on
listed or proposed endangered species may be insufficient in some
cases if the release of the gene drive could result in population
collapses in nonlisted species. Limiting the scope of an EA to
consider only field trials, as opposed to national or international
impacts, may also be insufficient if gene drives could potentially
spread to nontarget populations. NEPA requires consideration of
worst-case scenarios and thus allows agencies to conduct more
expansive analyses for field trials, but agencies have discretion to
determine which scenarios to consider.123
C.

Nonregulatory Governance

The limitations of the ESA and the statutes forming the basis of
the Coordinated Framework leave many of the crucial decisions
regarding the intersection of gene editing and species viability to
nonregulatory forms of governance such as standards, codes of
120. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 65–67.
121. Id. at 58.
122. Id. at 57–58.
123. Flatt, supra note 108, at 32–33; Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental
Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100
GEO. L.J. 1507, 1519 (2012) (“[A]gencies can seek to avoid preparing an EIS by agreeing
to mitigate environmental impacts as necessary to reduce the impact of the proposed
action below the ‘significant’ threshold.”); see also COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY
OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, 19–20 (1997), https://ceq.doe.gov/
docs/ceq-publications/nepa25fn.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSL9-FT23].
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conduct, and guidelines.124 Scientists may develop their own ethical
codes.125 Government agencies and foundations funding research may
impose their own requirements.126 Universities and other research
institutions appoint committees to oversee research on human and
animal subjects.127 Research projects may create their own standards,
such as the international Target Malaria project that established its
own ethics advisory committee, research transparency requirements,
and stakeholder engagement strategies.128
A growing body of scholarship points to these “soft law”
mechanisms as critical components of a governance system for
emerging technologies.129 Rigid restrictions on research and
experimentation may hamper scientists’ ability to explore new
technologies that could have profound social impacts.130 Soft law
measures provide oversight for research and development phases.
Because they are not regulatory, they can evolve more quickly than
formal regulation, particularly where existing statutes do not
adequately address issues presented by the new technology.131
Nonbinding governance measures already guide gene-editing
research, including species management and de-extinction, and others
are proposed by academics and stakeholders.132
124. See, e.g., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 148 (identifying three
types of governance for gene drives: self-governance by scientists involved in the research,
formal regulation by national or state authorities, and a “middle ground in which
governments create guidelines that shape the behavior of scientists and research
institutions by creating norms and expectations of good practice”).
125. Id. at 148, tbl.8-1.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, UNC: RESEARCH,
https://research.unc.edu/iacuc/ [https://perma.cc/63VN-N6GP]; Introduction to Human
Research Subject Protection, UNC: RESEARCH, https://research.unc.edu/human-researchethics/introduction-human-research-subject-protection-unc/ [https://perma.cc/X3J7-ZXUQ]
(noting that the University of North Carolina has institutional review boards that review
each research study project).
128. Ethics Advisory Committee, TARGET MALARIA, https://targetmalaria.org/ethicsadvisory-committee/ [https://perma.cc/8Y5V-DXM2].
129. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 167; see also Timothy F.
Malloy, Soft Law and Nanotechnology: A Functional Perspective, 52 JURIMETRICS 347,
349 (2012); Ana Nordberg et al., Cutting Edges and Weaving Threads in the Gene Editing
(R)evolution: Reconciling Scientific Progress with Legal, Ethical, and Social Concerns, 5
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 35, 82 (2018) (noting the “important role” of soft law mechanisms).
130. See, e.g., Mandel & Marchant, supra note 12, at 158–59. Genetically modified
organisms may also pose significant risks to public health and ecosystems. Id. at 159.
131. Id. at 158–59.
132. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 7–8; Claudia Emerson et al.,
Principles for Gene Drive Research, 358 SCIENCE 1135, 1135–36 (2017); INT’L UNION FOR
CONSERVATION OF NATURE, IUCN SSC GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON CREATING PROXIES
OF
EXTINCT
SPECIES
FOR
CONSERVATION
BENEFIT
10–12
(2016),
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While soft law measures are crucial components to a governance
system, they are not well suited for questions regarding voluntary
extinction or de-extinction and do not replace the need for
democratic decisionmaking to determine the proper balance between
public health, environmental, and economic considerations. The
technical experts who develop and oversee professional standards and
guidelines may prioritize risk management and safety over
conservation goals and other societal values.133 Stakeholder
engagement, while increasingly recognized as an important element in
technology governance, may not be a priority or may not be feasible
due to limited resources.134
Furthermore, disagreement among scientists regarding the
proper use of gene editing highlights the problems with relying on soft
law to fill in where regulation does not provide clear signals regarding
value choices and acceptable levels of risk. Thus far, key figures in the
development of CRISPR and the use of CRISPR to facilitate gene
drives have called for major limitations on the use of techniques soon
after publishing papers describing the techniques.135 Scholars debate
these proposals in academic journals. In the meantime, experiments
with CRISPR and gene drives continue unabated.
III. ALIGNING BIOTECHNOLOGY AND CONSERVATION
GOVERNANCE: A PROPOSAL
The prospect of voluntary extinction, combined with the pace
and scale of CRISPR developments, calls for a consistent set of
standards to guide formal regulatory activity as well as the range of
soft law measures that guide the trajectory of gene-editing research.
Although the ESA and other conservation statutes may not be
directly applicable, they are a compelling indication of societal values.
Biotechnology
governance
should
incorporate
reasonable
https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/Rep-2016-009.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R7JE-FCGD]; Douglas J. McCauley et al., A Mammoth Undertaking: Harnessing Insight
from Functional Ecology to Shape De-Extinction Priority Setting, 31 FUNCTIONAL
ECOLOGY 1003, 1003 (2016) (proposing that de-extinction efforts “(i) select target species
from guilds with low functional redundancy; (ii) concentrate on species that went extinct
recently rather than older extinctions; and (iii) only work with species that can be restored
to levels of abundance that meaningfully restore ecological function”).
133. Monast, supra note 41, at 2381–82.
134. Natalie Kofler et al., Editing Nature: Local Roots of Global Governance, 362
SCIENCE 527, 527, 529 (2018) (stating that community engagement is “largely missing”
from the process of gene-editing research and development).
135. Esvelt et al., supra note 6, at 1; see also David Baltimore et al., A Prudent Path
Forward for Genomic Engineering and Germline Gene Modification, 348 SCIENCE 36, 36
(2015); Oye et al., supra note 65, at 626.
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presumptions about the appropriate use of new technologies based on
conservation efforts already in place.
The ESA, in particular, is an enduring policy statement about the
intrinsic value of species and the importance of conservation. The
principles that form the foundation of the ESA can, and should, guide
the use of gene editing. Boiling the ESA down to its core elements,
the law recognizes that humans generally have an obligation to
prevent extinction, that protecting threatened species requires
protecting individual members of species, and that federal agencies
must avoid exacerbating threats to endangered species.136 This
structure—creating broad protections for threatened or endangered
species, exempting certain species, and providing limited exemptions
for activity that may harm protected species—provides a template for
aligning biotechnology and conservation. Incorporating these
elements into gene-editing governance would provide clear policy
guidance regarding acceptable uses of gene editing.
The remainder of this Article recommends three revisions to
biotechnology governance as an initial step to align gene-editing
research and conservation goals. The first two recommendations
apply the ESA framework to biotechnology governance generally: (1)
federal agencies should indicate that they will not generally allow the
release of GE organisms that could threaten species viability; and (2)
the agencies should allow for exemptions to the general ban and
specify criteria for qualifying for exemptions. The third
recommendation identifies initial updates to ESA regulations to
clarify how the statute applies to genetically modified organisms.
A. Establish a Presumption Against Release of Genetically Modified
Organisms that Could Foster Species Extinction
As a threshold matter, federal agencies should establish a
presumption against releasing modified organisms that present a risk
of extinction for the target species or other nontarget species. This
step would provide clarity for regulators, researchers, and investors.
This step would also inform soft law governance measures.
Implementation could take different forms, some of which could
occur via existing statutory authority and some of which would
require new legislation. One option includes directing the Council on
Environmental Quality, or the lead permitting agency, to revise
NEPA procedures to specify that agencies should reject proposed
releases of GE organisms if the NEPA process identifies a reasonable
136. See supra notes 75–91 and accompanying text.
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risk to species viability, including to nontarget species.137 While such a
step would place limits on some near-term applications of gene
editing, extinction and the potential for major irreversible ecological
impacts are the quintessential examples where clear guidance is
important. This move would not bar future developments that would
either achieve desired outcomes without threatening species viability
or fall within a specified exemption. Revised NEPA guidelines could
also require agencies to specify, in a transparent manner, the
acceptable and unacceptable levels of potential risk to the ecosystem
and nontarget species. Finally, NEPA revisions could also focus geneediting research efforts on nonlethal strategies, such as targeting a
virus rather than its carrier or gene drive techniques that phase out
over generations.138
Federal agencies funding gene-editing research should also
implement the presumption against extinction in their funding
guidelines. Guidelines from the National Institutes of Health
(“NIH”), for example, establish safety practices and containment
procedures to protect researchers, the public, and the environment.
The NIH Guidelines only apply to government funding and thus do
not apply to research funded solely via private investment.139 The
Guidelines also focus solely on laboratory research and do not
address prospective release of GE organisms into the environment.140
The NIH Guidelines have a broad reach nonetheless.141 Institutions
receiving, or hoping to receive, NIH funding may require all
researchers to comply with the guidelines, not just those that may
qualify for the federal funding.142
137. The Council on Environmental Quality “oversees NEPA implementation,
principally through issuing guidance and interpreting regulations that implement NEPA's
procedural requirements” and “reviews and approves Federal agency NEPA procedures,
approves alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA for emergencies, [and]
helps to resolve disputes between Federal agencies and with other governmental entities
and members of the public . . . .” Council on Environmental Quality, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/ [https://perma.cc/M2UC-DCC9].
138. See Yuemei Dong et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Knockout of Anopheles
Gambiae FREP1 Suppresses Malaria Parasite Infection, 14 PLOS PATHOGENS, no.
e1006898, Mar. 8, 2018, at 1, 1; Marshall & Akbari, supra note 35, at 425–28 (discussing
strategies to control gene drives after release).
139. Mandel & Marchant, supra note 12, at 192.
140. Id. at 193.
141. Jeffery D. Wolt, Safety, Security, and Policy Considerations for Plant Genome
Editing, in 149 PROGRESS MOLECULAR BIOLOGY & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 215, 232
(2017).
142. See David Rainer & Susan Cook, Overcoming Regulatory Gaps in Biological
Materials Oversight by Enhancing IBC Protocol Review, in ENSURING NATIONAL
BIOSECURITY 73, 86 (Carole R. Baskin & Alan P. Zelicoff eds., 2016); see also UNC
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Federal funding and research guidance need not ban funding
recipients from laboratory-scale research that could impact species
viability. Such research may be necessary to develop new techniques
that address social needs without eradicating species, techniques that
can accomplish goals such as the eradication of malaria by modifying
mosquitos so they cannot serve as a vector.143 Guidance and funding
restrictions could, however, prioritize strategies that do not rely on
species eradication and potentially provide guidance on the release of
genetically modified organisms developed through the use of federal
funding.
B.

Allow Exemptions for Specific Public Health and Environmental
Goals

The presumption against the release of GE organisms that could
trigger extinction need not be absolute. There are compelling health
and governance justifications for utilizing CRISPR to control
infectious diseases, particularly when conventional control strategies
are ineffective or prohibitively expensive (e.g., malaria or Zika
virus).144
In addition to health benefits, the focus on a small number of
vectors of severe infectious diseases could serve as a testing ground
for gene-editing techniques, allowing researchers to gather
information on the implications of population management and
species conservation via gene editing. Allowing limited uses of gene
editing would not restrict laboratory-scale experiments, thus striking a
balance between precaution and technology development. It would
also allow opportunities for regulators and stakeholders to develop
informed opinions about gene editing as information becomes
available. Information from the early stage uses of gene editing could
then guide regulatory decisions and stakeholder engagement
involving other potential releases of GE organisms.
Other exemptions could also apply when species eradication is
the goal. In the context of invasive rodents endangering the viability
DEP’T OF ENV’T, HEALTH & SAFETY, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING
RECOMBINANT OR SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES 4 (2017), https://ehs.unc.edu/
files/2015/11/rdna.pdf [https://perma.cc/B359-3X3S] (“NIH Guidelines are applicable to[]
[r]esearch conducted at or sponsored by an institution that receives any support for
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid research from the NIH.”).
143. Dong et al., supra note 138, at 1–3.
144. See, e.g., Antonio Regalado, Bill Gates Doubles His Bet on Wiping Out
Mosquitoes
with
Gene
Editing,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Sept.
6,
2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602304/bill-gates-doubles-his-bet-on-wiping-out-mosquitoeswith-gene-editing/ [https://perma.cc/5VSD-CRD7].
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of island bird populations, for example, the only viable option may be
removing, as opposed to controlling, the rodent populations.145 This
type of exemption is potentially expansive and could include a wide
range of agricultural pests. Specific criteria for the exemption would
be necessary to ensure that the exception does not undermine efforts
to impose meaningful limits on the use of biotechnology to eradicate
species.
C.

Clarify the ESA’s Application to Genetically Modified Organisms

The first two recommendations provide guidance for geneediting research, but they do not clarify broader questions regarding
the ESA’s applicability to genetically modified organisms. As noted
above, addressing GE organisms is not the only area where the ESA
needs to evolve to remain effective in a world with changing climates
and migrating species. A detailed set of recommendations to prepare
the ESA for current and emerging challenges is beyond the scope of
this Article.146 Instead, the remainder of this Article recommends
initial steps that could occur via administrative rulemaking or
legislation to align the ESA with the recent advancements in genomic
sciences.
First, policymakers could resolve uncertainty regarding the
ESA’s reach over gene-edited organisms by clarifying that the
definition of species includes GE organisms. The statute provides
only a general definition of the term “species” that is broad enough to
include species with genetic codes altered by humans.147 Extending
ESA protections to GE organisms could be particularly important if
the purpose of the genetic modification is to preserve an existing
species or reestablish viable populations of extinct species. Otherwise
the genetic intervention could create the ironic effect of preventing
the modified organism from qualifying for ESA protections.
Second, policymakers could adapt a 1996 proposed rule on
hybrid species—species resulting from cross-breeding between
protected and unprotected species in the wild or in captivity—to

145. McGrath, supra note 4; see also Gurevitch & Padilla, supra note 48, at 470.
146. Other scholars have offered detailed recommendations for updating conservation
statutes. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 50, at 897–902 (proposing a “risk-based adaptive
ecosystem management” approach to address de-extinction); Ruhl, supra note 98, at 60–62
(recommending certain FWS steps to help threatened and endangered species survive
threats posed by climate change).
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2012) (defining “species” to include “any subspecies of
fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate
fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature”).
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address GE organisms. The proposed rule would have protected
hybrid species that more closely resemble a protected species than a
hybrid of a protected and an unprotected species.148 The proposed
rule did not protect cross-breeding in captivity or “the artificial
transfer of genetic material from one taxonomic species into another
(i.e., transgenics),” but it did make an exception for captive breeding
conducted pursuant to an approved recovery plan.149 The agencies
never finalized a rule addressing hybridization, relying instead on
case-by-case determinations.150
Applying the proposed hybrid species rule to GE organisms
would strike a compromise that extends ESA protections to gene
editing intended to support recovery efforts while excluding other GE
organisms created in laboratories and those targeting species that are
not listed as endangered or threatened. The approach could leave
important gaps, particularly if recovery efforts are not first approved
by the FWS or NMFS. It would, however, provide a pathway for
conservation-focused gene editing, and the agencies could update the
approach as biotechnology matures.
CONCLUSION
CRISPR may add to a suite of tools for conservation on the one
hand and species eradication on the other. It may also change the
equation on extinction itself, allowing scientists to reverse extinction
in some circumstances and deliberately foster extinction in others.
Gene editing, therefore, raises important questions for conservation
and natural resource management. U.S. law does not currently
address these questions and the gaps in U.S. regulation of
biotechnology and endangered species leave regulators and
researchers without clear policy guidance regarding acceptable uses
of gene editing. Without updates that address the overlap between
biotechnology and conservation governance, regulation will evolve
based on case-by-case applications of existing laws that were not
designed to address the biotechnology-conservation nexus.
Regulators and researchers have an opportunity to incorporate
conservation goals into biotechnology governance, particularly while
148. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Policy and Proposed
Rule on the Treatment of lntercrosses and Intercross Progeny (the Issue of
“Hybridization”); Request for Public Comment, 61 Fed. Reg. 4710, 4710–11 (proposed
Feb. 7, 1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).
149. Id. at 4712.
150. John A. Erwin, Hybridizing Law: A Policy for Hybridization Under the
Endangered Species Act, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10615, 10615 (2017).
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much CRISPR-related research remains at an early stage. The
proposal outlined in this Article strikes a balance between scientific
research, societal benefits, and a precautionary approach for genetic
techniques that are still in developmental stages. It also recognizes
that questions about species viability do not start with a blank slate.
Society has made important value choices regarding species
conservation that provide the foundation of the ESA and other
conservation statutes. Gene-editing governance should incorporate
these value choices to ensure that any gene-editing efforts deliver
societal benefits without undermining conservation goals.

